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20th Century Wars

Yamamoto's Allied Nicknames

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#1 of 45 Posted Oct-15 8:21 PM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To All [Msg # 128527.1 ]

During WW II and the Pacific Theatre, to what nickname(s) or codename(s) did the Allies refer to Imperial Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto?

In particular, what codename was Yamamoto assigned by the Americans for their secret mission that intercepted his plane on 18 April 1943 on its flight from Rabaul to Ballalae Airfield?

Also, if known, when were the Cactus Squadron told who it was they were intercepting?

RJ Emery

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#2 of 45 Posted Oct-15 11:02 PM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.2 128527.1 ]

>> During WW II and the Pacific Theatre, to what nickname(s) or codename(s) did the Allies refer to Imperial Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto? <<

I've read a lot of accounts of the Pacific War, both first-hand from men who fought there and second-hand by historians who had access to the document archives. I don't recall ever reading of specific codenames being assigned to Yamamoto, or to any other Japanese admiral either. Which doesn't mean it didn't happen; only that if it did, it must have been a rather esoteric thing, which remained classified long after most other details of the war were off the Secret list.

>> In particular, what codename was Yamamoto assigned by the Americans for their secret mission that intercepted his plane on 18 April 1943 on its flight from Rabaul to Ballalae Airfield? <<

Again, none that I know of. I have three different accounts of the "get Yamamoto" mission, in varying levels of detail. Several more are available on the Web. There's general agreement that the operation was codenamed "Operation Vengeance," but I see no references to any codename for the target. In any case, the intercept mission was put together at the drop of a hat. CinCPac Intelligence intercepted the signal with Yamamoto's planned itinerary on April 13th and decoded it the next day; that gave only three days to get the necessary equipment to Guadalcanal and plan the attack. I have a little bit of trouble believing that an operation which was thrown together so quickly would have used elaborate codenames.

-- JSW

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#3 of 45 Posted Oct-18 12:42 AM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Jon Woolf [Msg # 128527.3 128527.2 ]

Jon,

I don't recall ever reading of specific codenames being assigned to Yamamoto ...

Yes, that is my recollection from my various readings as well. Yamamoto may well have had unofficial nicknames among the local servicemen and women, but none specifically in code breaking circles. In fact, in Japanese coded transmissions, he was simply referred to as the C-in-C, not unlike our own CINCPAC.

I have three different accounts of the "get Yamamoto" mission, in varying levels of detail.

There does seem to be general agreement as to how the mission was planned and executed, but the post-mission analyses diverged substantially. There's the Army version, the Navy version, and I suppose even now the Air Force version. The claims led to bitter discourse and rightly so. It was a team effort, and no one should have profited at the expense of others. It wasn't until the crash site was visited decades later and the only surviving Japanese Zero pilot interviewed that many of the facts were finally put straight.

I myself would like to further research the decision to "get Yamamoto" as there is a school of thought that his death actually prolonged the war by a year. At the time, there were many in the intelligence community who thought it was a foolish mission regardless of how successful it might be given the potential for the Japanese to realize the Americans were reading their codes.

RJ Emery

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#4 of 45 Posted Oct-18 1:09 AM

From Hemlock Posts 1990 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.4 128527.3 ]

Good day -I was interested to read -and in a sense discover that Admiral Yamamoto was not only a bit of a rebel .........but also a 'ladies man'--brings a new dimension to a biography.

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#5 of 45 Posted Oct-18 7:39 AM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Hemlock [Msg # 128527.5 128527.4 ]

Hemlock,

I don't believe Yamamoto was a rebel so much as a visionary. Like Doolittle, he foresaw the power of aviation and strove to remake the Japanese Navy fit that new concept.

As for being a ladies' man, that is one way of putting it. As a younger man, he did seem to visit regularly the 'pleasure houses' of Tokyo (according to some accounts), eventually settling upon one geisha in particular as his life-long mistress. Such behavior was rather common, and may still be, among world leaders (and non-leaders) of the time. Rather than a new dimension, I consider it more a footnote.

Clearly Yamamoto was a genius. In his two years at Harvard (1919-1921) and in the United States, he mastered English, pursued all things American and particularly its industrial and agricultural capacity, grasped oil economics fully, and became an expert at bridge and poker, among many other endeavors and pursuits. I'm hard pressed to name others of equal stature. For example, I would place him above Albert Einstein in mental capacity and reasoning. That to me is the new dimension of the man.

RJ Emery

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#6 of 45 Posted Oct-18 9:03 AM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.6 128527.3 ]

>> There's the Army version, the Navy version, and I suppose even now the Air Force version. <<

?? The Navy's only role in the "Get Yamamoto" mission was to provide the intel that started it, from a decrypted Japanese Navy radio message. And the Air Force didn't exist. It was an Army Air Forces mission. As far as I know, the primary controversy stems from which pilot actually shot down Yamamoto's aircraft, Rex Barber or Tom Lanphier. There's also an argument over kill-counts, but there are always arguments over kill counts.

>> I myself would like to further research the decision to "get Yamamoto" as there is a school of thought that his death actually prolonged the war by a year. <<

That's an idea I haven't heard before. What is it based on?

-- JSW

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#7 of 45 Posted Oct-18 9:57 AM

From Hemlock Posts 1990 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.7 128527.5 ]

Yamamoto had indeed vision -and in an age when most so many senior officers were linked to tradition .

There can be little doubt that many saw him as a threat to their power structures. I did wonder if he had the 'Ear of the Emperor'

He was for certain keen to learn about About American Industry and the powerful industrial potential and the way Americans thought.

Japanese Naval Aviation was quiet advanced and well trained,

It would seem that there was a general belief that naval codes were secure -a mistake the German High Command also made.

I must say that the things he inspired those under his leadership and command does indicate a remarkable Officer with a unnique vision of air power at sea.

But he must have realised the awesome potential of the American people if united against their enemies.

But as ever-those who were to provide support Yamamoto did let him down -and at Pearl harbour not being able to destroy the Pacific US Carriers must have been a bitter blow.

Methinks that with the way the world is -we will need the Imperial Japanese Navy again !!!!!!!-on our side.

It is my personal view that Naval Aviators need to be very skilled and flexible (By Naval) one must include the USMC !!!!!!!!!!!!!

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#8 of 45 Posted Oct-18 10:53 AM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Jon Woolf [Msg # 128527.8 128527.6 ]

Jon,

I have subsequently learned that there are separate versions in Army, Navy and now Air Force records. Only the latter is presently significant.

According to the latest (ca. 1985) official determinations of the event, Lanphier's claim on the Betty bomber(s) was reduced by one-half, and a claim for downing a Zero (that actually returned to base) was disallowed. In fact, Lanphier's record now stands at four kills, which also negates him as an ace.

Other organizations, notably the Aces Organization, the National Museum of the Pacific War (Nimitz Foundation) and others, later investigated Lanphier's claim and, for all intents and purposes, discredited it.

In fact, it appears from the bullet hole evidence in Yamamoto's downed Betty that Lanphier's guns never struck anything on that day of April 18, 1943. He was a man out for personal glory at the expense of his comrades, just about the worst kind of individual one would want fighting beside oneself.

That whole mission was a team effort, and credit has to go to the entire team, not just one member of the kill flight. It's like a lone basketball player claiming victory for a team win.

>> ... there is a school of thought that [Yamamoto's] death actually prolonged the war by a year. << That's an idea I haven't heard before. What is it based on?

There were many in the naval intelligence community who were opposed to the "get Yamamoto" mission:

One, it might reveal to the enemy our breaking of their code. Only by luck did that not happen. That in itself is another story.

Two, Yamamoto expressed many times both before and during the war that Japan could not defeat the United States.

Three, Yamamoto had the ear of the Emperor Hirohito, and it was expected that he would eventually join the War Cabinet in Tokyo, where he would have had a moderating influence on the decision making. Japan may well have sued for peace long before 1945. Japanese diplomats tried to do just that, and at least one was assassinated by the military dictatorship that ruled Japan at the time. Those in power wanted every Japanese citizen to die fighting the enemy, right down to the last man.

Four, despite Yamamoto's battle planning brilliance, the Pacific war had already turned decidedly in favor of the allies, although few on the front lines would have thought so at the time. It was the code breaking that gave the Allies all that was needed to defeat the enemy. We knew Japan's playbook, often before their own units in the field did.

It is very doubtful Yamamoto and his Navy, ever diminishing in ships and numbers, would have been able to launch an assault that would have surprised and/or crippled any Allied advance. This is not to say encounters with the enemy, due to Bushido, would have been any less bloody.

Hindsight being what it is, if I were Admiral King, I would have overruled Nimitz. However, like the Doolittle Raid exactly one year earlier, the Yamamoto mission was what FDR wanted, and that was that.

RJ Emery

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#9 of 45 Posted Oct-18 10:56 AM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.9 128527.5 ]

>> Clearly Yamamoto was a genius. <<

I don't know about that ...

I'll agree that Yamamoto Isoroku belongs in the top tier of 20th Century naval commanders. But a genius? Much of Yamamoto is legend, not reality. And much of the Legend of Yamamoto is built on just three points: his creation of the Japanese Naval Air Force, the Pearl Harbor Attack, and a handful of famous quotes about Japan's chances in a war with the USA.

Yamamoto might equally well be described as a spectacular failure, a man whose reach consistently exceeded his grasp. Once Japan's initial momentum wore out in spring 1942, Yamamoto's own flaws began to show. He consistently chose "classic Japanese" tactics over innovative ones ... which led to Japanese defeats with equal consistency. This is not the stuff of which military geniuses are made. Compare to Nimitz, Spruance, Halsey, Turner, Vandegrift. Even MacArthur, as little as I think of him, demonstrated more military ability and acumen than Yamamoto did.

-- JSW

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#10 of 45 Posted Oct-18 12:04 PM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.10 128527.8 ]

>> According to the latest (ca. 1985) official determinations of the event, Lanphier's claim on the Betty bomber(s) was reduced by one-half, and a claim for downing a Zero (that actually returned to base) was disallowed. <<

This matches what I've been able to find online. The last official comment on the affair was in 1992/93, but it let the matter stand: Lanphier and Barber each received half-credit for Yamamoto's bomber, and (as far as I can tell), Barber shared credit with Ray Hines and Besby Holmes for shooting down the second bomber.

Incidentally, the SYMA site includes a copy of the official mission report. It claims three Betty bombers shot down, of which two crashed on land and the third went into the water. I just remembered a fourth account of the mission, which I don't have handy, but I think I remember most of the details. Admiral Ugaki Matome was aboard the second bomber, survived the crash, and recorded what he saw and thought in his diary. He said that the bomber carrying Yamamoto crashed on land, and his bomber crashed in the water. Ugaki's plane is thus clearly the one that Barber, Hines, and Holmes shared credit for. Thus, there are only three alternatives for the bomber that Yamamoto was aboard: Either Lanphier shot it down alone and Barber's claim of a second kill was wrong; Barber shot it down alone and Lanphier's claim was wrong; or they shared the kill.

After reading the mission report, I think the shared-kill version is probably correct. I don't believe that either man intentionally lied about what he saw or what he did. There is no gun-camera footage of the mission. Neither man rode his kill, and no other pilot in the group could corroborate either of their accounts. So we're left with the forensic evidence, which is inconclusive, and their own eyewitness testimony, which is extremely unreliable in aerial combat. According to SYMA, Yamamoto's bomber crashed with the wings intact, but nothing is said about the tail. Both Lanphier and Barber claimed to have fired on a Betty and quickly ripped it apart, with a major piece breaking off and the remainder going down in flames. Based on all this, I can see two main possibilities:

1) Barber and Lanphier fired at Yamamoto's bomber almost simultaneously from different positions and angles. Both got hits, and the combined weight of fire took the Betty apart almost instantly. A major piece of the tail broke off under the fire; Barber saw this and identified it correctly, while Lanphier misidentified it as a piece of wing.

2) Barber's guns set an engine afire but the pilot successfully shut down the engine and extinguished the fire, producing the illusion of an undamaged bomber for Lanphier to attack moments later. Ugaki's account supports this, as he indicates that Yamamoto's bomber may have been attacked twice. The first attack left it slowed and smoking but still flying. The second finished it.

>> Three, Yamamoto had the ear of the Emperor Hirohito, and it was expected that he would eventually join the War Cabinet in Tokyo, where he would have had a moderating influence on the decision making. <<

This strikes me as a bit of wishful thinking. It's much more likely that he simply would have been murdered by the militarists.

>> Four, despite Yamamoto's battle planning brilliance, the Pacific war had already turned decidedly in favor of the allies, although few on the front lines would have thought so at the time. <<

Yes.

>> It was the code breaking that gave the Allies all that was needed to defeat the enemy. We knew Japan's playbook, often before their own units in the field did. <<

No. Code breaking alone was not enough. It wasn't even enough in the European Theater, where Bletchley Park consistently read German naval and air force ciphers for most of the war. It was certainly not enough in the Pacific. It was unreliable and intermittent. It rarely gave the full picture. Mere codebreaking could not actually win battles. It took men, guns, and ammunition to do that. And there's always the bona fortuna factor to consider: codebreaking could not protect against a daring Japanese sub skipper torpedoing a carrier, or a failure of CAP that let a couple of carriers be hit by enemy bombers.

And history is unpredictable. How, for example, would the American public have reacted to news of a major defeat at Philippine Sea four months before the 1944 presidential election? Or an even bigger defeat at Leyte Gulf, just days before the election?

-- JSW

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#11 of 45 Posted Oct-18 12:54 PM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Jon Woolf [Msg # 128527.11 128527.10 ]

Jon,

My interpretation of the records differs from yours, but that is a matter of opinion. I'll respond to just a few of your points.

Halsey was the worst thing that could have ever happened to the US Navy. Had he been in charge at Midway, it would have been an unmitigated disaster. The retreating Japanese laid a trap for Spruance, but he would not take the bait, a decision for which he was chewed out by both Halsey and Nimitz.

Halsey would have fallen for the trap and snatched defeat out of the jaws of victory. Spruance wisely assessed the poor performance of the American aviators and would not risk more than the Yorktown lost. The American victory at Midway had as much to do with luck as it was to intelligence.

Halsey, like MacArthur, was one of those out for personal glory no matter the cost of Allied lives. Halsey proved it at the Battle of Leyte Gulf, when he fell for a Japanese feint and pursued it with most of the fleet. Halsey's ego was such that he desperately wanted to be the next Jellico. It was not to be.

I have little respect for either Halsey or MacArthur, but that is just my opinion. WRT to MacArthur, as far as I am concerned, the wrong general got left behind at Corregidor.

This thread is not about Halsey, others or other battles. For me to comment further, I would have to review my notes on the Philippine campaigns. I don't have time to do that. My interest currently is strictly Yamamoto.

RJ Emery

Edited Oct-18 by RJ Emery

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#12 of 45 Posted Oct-18 1:26 PM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Hemlock [Msg # 128527.12 128527.7 ]

Hemlock,

But [Yamamoto] must have realised the awesome potential of the American people if united against their enemies.

He did. He knew war with the United States was not winnable. The American industrial and agricultural capacity far outweighed whatever Japan could muster, especially over the long term.

The drift of my ongoing research holds that Yamamoto was very much against any war with the United States and argued against it in the highest echelons of Japan's military overseers. However, once the decision was made, Yamamoto followed orders and planned the attack to the best of his ability.

But as ever-those who were to provide support Yamamoto did let him down -and at Pearl harbour not being able to destroy the Pacific US Carriers must have been a bitter blow.

Not so. The attack was not suppose to be a surprise. Following the pattern established by the United States with the Spanish-American War, also begun on a Sunday, a declaration of war was to have been delivered hours before any military action commenced. Pearl Harbor was expected to be on high alert. Ships were assumed to have weighed anchor and either departing or departed. Defending aircraft were expected to be airborne. In fact, the actual declaration of war was delivered many hours after the attack had already commenced. Due to the lack of advance notification, the attack was far more successful than the Japanese had ever hoped it would be.

RJ Emery

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#13 of 45 Posted Oct-18 1:52 PM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To RJ Emery [Msg # 128527.13 128527.12 ]

>> The attack was not suppose to be a surprise. Following the pattern established by the United States with the Spanish-American War, also begun on a Sunday, a declaration of war was to have been delivered hours before any military action commenced. <<

I don't think so. The Pearl Harbor attack was definitely supposed to be a surprise attack in time of war. All commanders always try to gain tactical surprise when raiding an enemy base. Yamamoto's plan was to score tactical surprise and smash the Pacific Fleet in harbor before it could sortie, then use the note delivered by the Japanese ambassador to Cordell Hull as a legalistic fig-leaf. He expected that the short interval between the delivery of the note at noon Washington time, and the actual attack an hour later, would be enough to establish it as legally time of war, but not enough for Pearl to take useful defensive measures.

What the raid was not intended to be is a sneak attack in time of peace.

As for your other post about Halsey: suffice to say that we do indeed disagree. Yes, Halsey in command at Midway instead of Spruance would have probably been a disaster. OTOH, Halsey in command instead of Spruance at the Battle of the Philippine Sea, two years later, might well have resulted in the destruction of the whole Japanese mobile fleet, not just its carrier aircraft. Halsey was no god of war, but as a fleet or area commander he was better than most.

-- JSW

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#14 of 45 Posted Oct-18 2:49 PM

From RJ Emery Posts 15 Last Oct-20
To Jon Woolf [Msg # 128527.14 128527.13 ]

Jon,

I don't think so. The Pearl Harbor attack was definitely supposed to be a surprise attack in time of war.

I quick review of the major facts supports your contention. The scheduled delivery of the Japanese declaration of war and the onset of hostilities were so closely timed as to amount to nothing less than a surprise attack. I retract my earlier statement. On that point, my memory was faulty.

RJ Emery

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#15 of 45 Posted Oct-24 8:28 PM

From Tim Callahan^SYSOP Posts 3939 Last Nov-24
To All [Msg # 128527.15 128527.1 ]

Where exactly was Yamamoto shot down? I think I'm not too far from that location, if my memory serves me correctly. I'm curious if the Japanese have put up a monument for Yamamoto somewhere around here. And here is a trivia question that is not nearly as hard as RJ Emery's opening question: what did the bar girls call Yamamoto and why?

Tim (from Bongao Island, Tawi-Tawi today)

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#16 of 45 Posted Oct-24 11:40 PM

From Jon Woolf Posts 369 Last Nov-24
To Tim Callahan^SYSOP [Msg # 128527.16 128527.15 ]

>> Where exactly was Yamamoto shot down? <<

Near the southern tip of Bougainville island, a few miles north of Buin airstrip. I can't tell whether or not this is the same place that is called Buin today. Apparently it's a known tourist destination and you can get guides to take you there.

-- JSW

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#17 of 45 Posted Oct-25 2:50 AM

From Tim Callahan^SYSOP Posts 3939 Last Nov-24
To Jon Woolf [Msg # 128527.17 128527.16 ]

Jon: "Near the southern tip of Bougainville island, a few miles north of Buin airstrip. I can't tell whether or not this is the same place that is called Buin today. Apparently it's a known tourist destination and you can get guides to take you there."

Thanks for that. The distance between here and Bougainville is not great, as the bird flies, but the direct route is through no-man's land. There is probably no safe direct way for me to get there, but I'll check.

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#18 of 45 Posted Oct-25 5:50 AM

From Hemlock Posts 1990 Last Nov-24
To Tim Callahan^SYSOP [Msg # 128527.18 128527.17 ]

Morning Tim------------One wonders how much the Japanese know about their communications been picked up and decoded . They knew about listening stations -but did they ever send messages designed to be picked up and perhaps acted upon?

Never ignore skilled radio operators who are good at morse code !!!!!!!!!I I assume that among that group in the Imperial Japanese navy and US Navy and other navys were the cream of the cream .

These men and women sort of read and composed morse more like music fiends than dots and dashes and could ident many of their own mates by a couple of taps on the key.

I am sure that any members who were good practioners of the lost are can confirm that even emotions and tensions could be felt by the way the message was composed.

Alas many of us will not be alive when much more facts come to life

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#19 of 45 Posted Oct-25 11:43 PM

From Tim Callahan^SYSOP Posts 3939 Last Nov-24
To Hemlock [Msg # 128527.19 128527.18 ]

Hi Hemlock,

Hem: "Morning Tim------------One wonders how much the Japanese know about their communications been picked up and decoded . They knew about listening stations -but did they ever send messages designed to be picked up and perhaps acted upon?"

That is a very good question. I have some books that might have the answer, but i'm far from them now. I'll be home in a week and try to find an answer then. Take care.

Regards,

Tim (Zamboanga City, Mindanao today)

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